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Blood, Sweat, Tears: A Re-Examination
of the Exploitation of College Athletes
Keely Grey FreshD*
Abstract
The unrest revolving around compensation for college athletes
is not a new concept. However, public attitudes are shifting. With
spirited arguments on both sides, and the recent Supreme Court
decision of National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston
regarding antitrust exemptions, the issue has been placed in a
spotlight. This Note examines the buildup of discontentment
through the history of the NCAA and amateurism, specifically how
the term “student-athlete” became coined. It will then move to
litigation efforts by athletes in an attempt to gain employment
status, and an alternative route of unionization. Models that
examine the fair market value of athletes, as well as the issue of rent
sharing, place the monetary value of this labor into perspective.
This Note highlights recent legislative pushes, both state and
federal, to compensate athletes through name, image and likeness
laws and the subsequent approval of the NCAA. However, this Note
proposes that this new publicity surrounding NIL law creates the
opportunity to rectify injustices beyond that of what third-party
compensation models could provide. In conclusion, this Note
advocates for the full-spectrum protection offered through a
proposed College Athletes Bill of Rights.
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I. Introduction
Collegiate athletes have long been fighting to expand their
rights, most notoriously on the compensation field.1 The National
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) is one of the most
profitable businesses in the country, raising $10.6 billion in
revenue in 2019 alone.2 The thirteen largest athletic departments
1. See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Oct.
2011) (discussing the structure of college sports and the billion-dollar revenues
generated by athletes that do not receive compensation) [perma.cc/BZH9-UY8H].
2. See Finances of Intercollegiate Athletics, NCAA (noting the amount of
revenue generated by athletics departments) [perma.cc/2Y8J-H5KJ].
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each bring in more than $100 million annually from sports—
almost entirely from men’s basketball and football.3 However, that
money goes towards paying millionaire coaches, building upscale
stadiums, and funding television ads, not paying the athletes that
bring in the crowds and provide their labor.4
Marketing experts have acknowledged that successful
collegiate athletic programs have a direct correlation to admissions
increases, often called the “Flutie Effect.”5 Harvard Business
School Assistant Professor Doug Chung found in his study that
when a school raises performance levels on the football field,
applications increase by 18.7%.6 To get a similar effect, the school
would have to lower tuition rates by 3.8%.7 With this increase in
applications, schools can become more academically selective—
raising both the quantity and quality of students—mostly due to
the success of the performing athletes.8 Success in sports raises a
general awareness of the institution, but sports-heavy American
culture also influences prospective students to want to be a part of
the winning side.9
Despite clear evidence that collegiate athletics create
substantial revenue and student admission increases to schools,
many fans still argue against the payment of players, believing
they already receive enough compensation through the benefit of a
“free education.”10 However, it is important to note that the benefit
3. See Eben Novy-Williams, College Sports, BLOOMBERG: QUICKTAKE (Sept.
27, 2017, 11:11 AM) (calculating the revenue top college athletics programs make
in a year) [perma.cc/6DG8-S7PV].
4. See id. (discussing the uses that the money raised goes towards).
5. See Sean Silverthorne, The Flutie Effect: How Athletic Success Boosts
College Applications, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2013, 9:48 AM) (discussing how Boston
College applications skyrocketed after Doug Flutie threw Hail Mary pass to beat
the University of Miami) [perma.cc/2MRQ-2JEW].
6. See id. (quantifying the theory that the primary form of mass media
advertising by academic institutions is through their athletic programs).
7. See id. (explaining Professor’s Chung’s research which found that
athletic success boosts admissions applications at academic institutions).
8. See id. (discussing how Georgetown University applications multiplied
by 45% between 1983 and 1986 following significant basketball success).
9. See id. (discussing Professor Chung’s speculation around a prospective
student’s wish to be a part of the social whirl associated with a winning sports
program).
10. See Brian Frederick, Fans Must Understand That College Sports is Big
Business, U.S. NEWS: DEBATE CLUB (Apr. 1, 2013, 5:46 PM) (debating the
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of education is dependent upon an athlete’s health and success,
and it always comes second to athletics.11 The system constantly
creates strategies to circumvent the rules by providing under-thetable benefits to athletes that the schools believe will improve their
chances of success on the court or field.12 Reform efforts to protect
young athletes from exploitation from the billion dollar sports
business are underway—but who should be responsible for
implementing them?
NCAA officials and school administrators may be too biased to
participate in leading reform for student athletes, as a main
component of these positions is to make money for their respective
organizations.13 For example, college administrators harp on the
wellbeing of students in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, yet
also vocalize the importance of student athletes physically
returning to campuses despite the inevitable health risks posed to
these players.14 Therefore, lawmakers would likely be the best
equipped to create and implement reform.15
This Note examines the history of college sports, the unrest
revolving around compensation to athletes, and then the recent
influx of legislative reform before endorsing a particular bill. Part
II analyzes the historical context around compensation,
predominantly through the ever-changing rules of amateurism
and the creation of the term “student athlete.”16 Part III looks to
efforts made in the past regarding athletes as employees through
the lenses of litigation, unionization attempts, and also economic
arguments for and against athletes being paid for their efforts)
[https://perma.cc/7W43-4UEY].
11. See id. (discussing how the so-called reward of free education is often
taken away when an athlete becomes injured or unproductive).
12. See id. (discussing how coaches and boosters find ways to get around
rules and bribe young athletes).
13. See John Feinstein, College Sports Needs Reform, and Congress Has a
Better Shot Than the NCAA, WASH. POST (June 3, 2020) (discussing the skepticism
surrounding Power Five administrators pushing for change) [perma.cc/TG9APUFU].
14. See id. (pointing out Notre Dame President John Jenkins’ explanation
for why there needed to be a physical presence of students on campus in August
2020, even though there would be a high risk of illness).
15. See id. (theorizing issues that would occur if the NCAA and individual
universities were left to create NIL law applicable to collegiate athletes).
16. See infra Part II.
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feasibility after considering the market value of athletes and
prospective compensation models.17 Part IV delves into the impact
of recent antitrust litigation, specifically a recent Supreme Court
decision.18 Part V discusses name, image, and likeness (“NIL”)
legislation at both the state and federal levels, the chain reaction
push for reform these proposals caused, and the NCAA’s
response.19 Part VI makes the case that new NIL compensation
model is beneficial, but instead endorses the opportunity to
implement full-spectrum protection for student athletes such as
Senator Booker’s proposal.20
II. A History of Amateurism
As of the time of writing, the NCAA requires all of its athletes
to be deemed amateurs before they are allowed to compete.21 There
are stringent requirements to ensure conformity—including a list
of actions for athletes to complete and an entire separate
committee to ensure that the information entered is correct.22 But,
these rules have not always been the same: the NCAA’s 1906
bylaws forbade the “offering of inducements to players to enter
colleges or universities because of their athletic abilities or
maintaining players while students on account of their athletic
abilities,” which would have made athletic scholarships as we
know them today a violation of the rules.23
Since the 1906 bylaws, the NCAA has continuously drafted
changes in its definition of amateurism.24 In 1916, the bylaws
stated that an amateur is “one who participates in competitive
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part VI.
21. See Amateurism, NCAA (describing guidelines all collegiate athletes
must follow) [perma.cc/HQ2H-QJQN].
22. See id. (displaying links for hopeful collegiate athletes to follow,
including to the Eligibility Center and the Clearing House).
23. See Jayma Meyer & Andrew Zimbalist, A Win Win: College Athletes Get
Paid for Their Names, Images, and Likenesses and Colleges Maintain the Primacy
of Academics, 11 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 247, 250–51 (2020) (quoting previous
NCAA bylaw which contained penalties for violation).
24. See id. at 250–53 (discussing the history of amateurism as the NCAA has
evolved).
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physical sports only for the pleasure, and the physical, mental,
moral, and social benefits derived therefrom.”25 Again changed in
1922, “an amateur sportsman is one who engages in sport solely
for the physical, mental, or social benefits he derives therefrom,
and to whom the sport is nothing more than an avocation.”26
Without having enforcement power in the early-to-mid 1900s,
there was rampant disregard of the amateurism rules by
institutions, which led to the NCAA attempting to ratify the reality
that players were receiving financial aid due to their athletic
ability.27
Even after modifying rules to allow for athletic-based
scholarships, the NCAA continued to evolve those rules from needbased only, to allowing compensation of educational expenses, to
the modern annual renewal of scholarships seen today.28
Interestingly enough, as early as 1957, the NCAA anticipated the
argument of compensating athletes and coined the term “studentathlete” as a way to cloak the actual relationship between the
parties.29
The term came in response to a 1953 Colorado Supreme Court
case which upheld a determination by the State Industrial
Commission that a football player at the University of Denver was
an employee within the meaning of the Colorado worker’s
compensation statute.30 From this decision, the NCAA quickly
revised its bylaws to use the term “student-athlete” and required
25. Id. at 251.
26. Id.
27. See id. (referencing a 1929 report that found three-quarters of the 112
colleges that were investigated violated the NCAA’s amateurism code, and a 1946
New York Herald Tribune article declaring that big-time football is in a class by
itself when it comes to “chicanery, double-dealing, and undercover work behind
the scenes”).
28. See id. at 252–53 (detailing the evolution from the 1948 “Sanity Code”
which only allowed financial aid if there was a need, to the 1957 expansion which
included room, board, tuition and other living costs, and finally to the 1973
response to complaints from coaches about the mandated four-year guarantee
scholarship).
29. See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the
Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 83–84
(2006) (detailing the history of how “student-athlete” was created).
30. See Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 430 (Colo. 1953) (finding
that an injury that was suffered during spring football practice arose out of and
in the course of the student’s employment with the university).
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its exclusive use thereafter in hopes to diminish tendencies to
characterize them as employees.31 Even then-NCAA Executive
Director Walter Byers wrote that the “NCAA adopted and
mandated the term ‘student-athletes’ purposely to buttress the
notion that such individuals should be considered students rather
than employees.”32
In recent years, the NCAA has continued to modify
amateurism rules at a rapid pace with the influx of litigation
regarding antitrust and labor laws.33 Changes have included
multi-year scholarship awards, an expansion of food services,
additional stipend money, and the permission to keep certain
awards and gifts.34 However, the current NCAA bylaws still
mandate that financial aid is not considered to be pay or the
promise of pay for athletics skills, and that payments to athletes
for athletic services are prohibited.35 Additionally, the bylaws
prohibit athletes from receiving money for promoting commercial
products and from using their own “name, photograph, appearance
or athletics reputation,” but also that “the NCAA and its member
institutions may use athletes to endorse their products and
activities in a wide variety of circumstances.”36
The ever-shifting rule changes demonstrate that the
amateurism requirements are whatever the NCAA decrees them
to be at the time. Athletes pushing for advancement of rights, such
as the creation of scholarships to cover educational expenses and
31. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 29 (discussing the NCAA’s
reaction to the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling that allowed workers’
compensation to be received by an athlete for football injuries).
32. See id. at 84 (quoting a writing by Byers discussing how the NCAA
addressed the “threat” of athletes being labeled employees).
33. See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 23, at 254–55 (referencing
adjustments that the NCAA has made regarding amateurism bylaws due to
external pressures).
34. See id. at 255–56 (listing changes in NCAA bylaws that increase
protection and benefits to athletes—such as being permitted to keep Olympic
prize money or merchandise from bowl games).
35. See 2020–21 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, ¶¶ 12.01.4, 12.1.2 (Aug. 1,
2020) (stating that athletes lose amateur status and eligibility if they are
compensated for performing, accept promise of payment, commit to play
professional athletics, receive salary or reimbursement from a professional sports
organization, compete on any professional team even without payment, enter a
draft, or sign with an agent).
36. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL ¶ 12.5.1.1.
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the recent expansion of allowing the retention of Olympic prizes,
show that the NCAA is not resistant to change when pushed for by
proponents.37 Due to this demonstrated propensity for change,
there should be no issue once again realigning the bylaws to
expand the rights of collegiate athletes to include appropriate
compensation for the work they provide for the NCAA and member
institutions.
III. Employment Benefits and Protections: Are Athletes
Employees?
It is almost impossible to name another group of people that
are prohibited from financially benefiting from unique talents—a
clear issue of discrimination against college athletes.38 Senator
Richard Blumenthal, a proponent of legislative reform, said that,
“[t]he present state of college athletics is undeniably exploitive,”
and that the “the literal blood, sweat and tears of student athletes”
fuels the multi-billion dollar industry.39 To the proponents of
legislation, reforming the system is all about basic justice—racial
justice, economic justice, and health care justice—and holding
schools and the NCAA accountable for their actions should be the
first step in accomplishing this goal.”40
A. Litigation Efforts Regarding Employment Status
So far athletes have been unsuccessful in litigation regarding
their status as employees, but the courts have left the door open

37. See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 23 (showing the flexibility of the
NCAA through the history of its rule changes regarding amateurism).
38. See Sean Gregory, How California’s Historic NCAA Fair Pay Law Will
Change College Sports for the Better, TIME (Oct. 1, 2019, 8:16 AM) (quoting
legislators who support California’s compensation bill, which equates the lack of
fairness in compensation to discrimination against athletes) [perma.cc/AA8F85BD].
39. See Booker, Senators Announce College Athletes Bill of Rights, CORY
BOOKER (Aug. 13, 2020) (explaining ten senators’ proposed framework for a new
college athletes bill of rights, including a guarantee of fair and equitable
compensation) [perma.cc/DCN9-7P3E].
40. See id. (quoting Blumenthal’s description of the bill intended to empower
athletes’ rights in many different arenas).
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for future claims.41 In Berger v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association,42 former women’s track athletes sued the NCAA
alleging that student athletes are employees within the meaning
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),43 and therefore claimed
that the NCAA and member schools violated the FLSA by not
paying athletes a minimum wage.44 There, the court refused to
consider the multi-factor tests that would satisfy the FLSA, as it
would not “take into account [the] tradition of amateurism or the
reality of the student-athlete experience.”45 To this court, Division
I sports were classified as an “extracurricular,” and therefore not
considered to be employment under the meaning of the FLSA.46
However, the loss in Berger has not prevented other athletes
from bringing labor violation actions.47 In 2019, a former PAC-12
football player brought a putative class action against the NCAA
and the PAC-12 Conference alleging violations of the FLSA and
the California Labor Code.48 There, the court determined that the
test of employment under the FLSA was one of “economic reality,”
and that the economic reality of the relationship between the
NCAA and the PAC-12 to student athletes does not reflect an

41. See Billy Witz, N.C.A.A. is Sued for Not Paying Athletes as Employees,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019) (discussing the failed attempts to force colleges to treat
athletes as employees) [perma.cc/F7F8-XU2V].
42. See Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir.
2016) (holding that former student athletes were not employees of the university).
43. See Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219
(2018) (establishing national labor standards meant to maintain minimum
thresholds of health, efficiency, and worker wellbeing without “substantially
curtailing employment or earning power” in the relevant industries).
44. See Berger, 843 F.3d at 289 (explaining the claims brought by student
athletes against the NCAA).
45. Id. at 291.
46. See id. at 292 (discussing the use of the Department of Labor Field
Operations Handbook in determining employment status of university or college
students).
47. See Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir.
2019) (exemplifying a later class action brought to determine whether FBS
football players were employees of the NCAA and PAC-12 within the meaning of
the FLSA).
48. See id. at 907 (questioning whether the NCAA or the PAC-12 were the
plaintiff’s employers under federal and state law).
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employment relationship.49 Under the circumstances of the whole
activity, the NCAA and respective conferences do not create an
expectation of compensation as neither the NCAA nor the PAC-12
award athletes scholarships, nor do the entities have the power to
hire or fire, and there is no evidence NCAA bylaws were conceived
or carried out to evade the law.50 However, the court left the gate
open for athletes to use labor laws to gain compensation by
refusing to rule on student athletes’ employment status in any
other context.51
Following the same course, another class action lawsuit
brought by a former athlete claims the NCAA and many of its
member schools violated minimum wage laws by refusing to pay
their athletes.52 In several past arguments, the NCAA relied upon
Vanskike v. Peters,53 in which the court denied an inmate a litmus
test to determine his employment status, as it would not “capture
the true nature of the relationship” between inmates and state
prisons.54 The NCAA’s reliance on Vanskike’s determination that
the Thirteenth Amendment permits involuntary servitude as
punishment for crime is both “offensive and misplaced.”55 By
arguing that exemption applies to the issue at hand, the NCAA
effectively compares college athletes to prisoners.56

49. See id. at 909 (discussing various factors a court may consider in
determining an economic relationship).
50. See id. at 909–10 (applying the factors mentioned above to the
relationship the athletes have with the NCAA).
51. See id. at 913–14 (explaining that the court did not reach other issues
urged by the parties nor express an opinion on employment status in other
contexts).
52. See Complaint ¶ 6, Johnson v. NCAA, 2019 WL 5847321 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(No. 19-5230) (exemplifying another class and collective action brought against
the NCAA and several member schools).
53. See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming the
district court’s decision that neither the Department of Corrections nor the state
of Illinois acted as an employer with respect to prisoners).
54. See id. at 809 (discussing that the application of employment factors
would not reveal the reality of the situation by implying a free labor relationship
of an inmate due to the very nature of incarceration).
55. See Complaint, supra note 52, ¶ 6.
56. See Witz, supra note 213 (showing that by the NCAA arguing the same
exemption should apply to athletes, the organization analogizes its student
athletes to prisoners).
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While courts classify sports as an extracurricular activity, that
classification makes little sense when the substantial costs and
average workload are examined.57 Athletes spend on average fifty
hours a week on athletics during the season—well over a standard
full-time job.58 While there are limits placed on required athletic
activity, many fail to realize that other activities that may not be
deemed required, but carry significant consequences to the
athletes if not completed, take up a majority of the time.59 For
example, travel time for competition is not factored into time
restraints, yet takes up around twenty-two hours a week and
forces missed classes, rescheduling of academic assignments, and
missed sleep and social events.60 Sleep was found to be the number
one thing that student athletes claim their time commitments
prevent them from doing.61
B. Unionization Attempts
Another way student athletes have sought to enforce their
rights is through unionization.62 In 2014, the Chicago region of the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) found that scholarship
players on the Northwestern University football team are
employees of the school, and therefore have the right to form a
union.63 In making this determination, the NLRB concluded that
“players receiving scholarships to perform football-related services
57. See Student-Athlete Time Demands, PENN SCHOEN BERLAND & PAC-12
CONFERENCE (Apr. 2015) (referencing a study conducted among 409 PAC-12
student athletes from nine universities to assess time demands and stressors)
[https://perma.cc/9FDL-UPQ4].
58. See id. (showing results of the study with average times spent on
activities related to athletics).
59. See id. (showing an additional twenty-nine hours per week spent on
activities such as voluntary workouts, treatment, and traveling for competitions).
60. See id. (discussing that 80% of PAC-12 athletes said they have missed
class for competition during the 2014–2015 season).
61. See id. (showing that 71% of student athletes mentioned sleep as the top
activity prevented by athletic commitments).
62. See Ian Crouch, Are College Athletes Employees?, THE NEW YORKER (Mar.
27, 2014) (discussing the efforts of college athletes to unionize)
[https://perma.cc/BTZ2-YCVT].
63. See id. (referencing the Region 13 decision that classified student
athletes as employees).
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for the Employer [Northwestern] under a contract for hire in
return for compensation are subject to the Employer’s control and
are therefore employees within the meaning of the [National Labor
Relations] Act.”64 The NCAA quickly responded with a statement
that the union-backed attempt to turn student athletes into
employees undermines the ultimate purpose of college—an
education.65
The NCAA argued that student athletes participate
voluntarily and are provided scholarships and other benefits for
participation.66 In 2015, the NLRB affirmed this principle in
dismissing the petition.67 However, in that decision, the board did
not rule directly on if players are university employees, instead
finding that the wide-ranging impact on college sports would not
have promoted “stability in labor relations.”68 This decision was a
narrow one, leaving open the possibility that a future case
regarding similar issues could be brought before the board.69
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) is the
foundational labor relations statute in the United States, acting as
the cornerstone of U.S. labor policy for over seventy years.70 While
the argument may be made that the NLRA addresses only private
enterprises, many state statutes are modeled after the NLRA and
usually derive meanings from its interpretation, as well as the
64. Nw. Univ. Emp. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n (CAPA), 2014 WL
1246914, *14 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 26, 2014).
65. See Donald Remy, NCAA Responds to Union Proposal, NCAA: PRESS
RELEASES (stating that the voluntary participation in sports does not make
athletes employees and that education is the purpose of college)
[https://perma.cc/FA4F-4C3P].
66. See id. (arguing that scholarships and unnamed “other benefits” for
participation are adequate compensation and do not form an employment
relationship).
67. See Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 17, 2015) (declining
jurisdiction because the Board concluded it would not effectuate the purposes of
the National Labor Relations Act).
68. See Ben Strauss, N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players’ Union
Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015) (summarizing the decision of the NLRB board to
deny the petition but refusing to rule on the central question in the case)
[https://perma.cc/3YMZ-D7H3].
69. See id. (discussing how the board decision applied only to the
Northwestern case, leaving the door open for similar claims in the future).
70. See National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD. (detailing
the history and the language of the Act) [https://perma.cc/56LH-3VAD].
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National Labor Review Board (“Board”) and federal courts.71 There
are two tests that must be met under the NLRA to classify a person
as an employee—a common law test and a recently changed
statutory test for university students seeking coverage under the
Act.72
Historically, the Board adopted the common law approach for
defining employees, known as the “right of control test,” with the
most important factor being the degree of control the alleged
employer maintained over the working life of the alleged
employee.73 Therefore, there is an employer-employee relationship
where the employer’s right to control or right of control included
“both the end result and the manner of achieving it,” and that
“under the common law, an employee is a person who performs
services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the other’s
control or right of control, and in return for payment.”74 In practice,
the Board’s reasoning has been swayed due to the economic
dependence of an employer—instead of solely using the control
rule, there is a blended approach of measuring the degree of control
with a consideration of the alleged employee’s economic
dependence upon the employer.75
The special statutory test introduced above culminated in
Brown University,76 in which the Board determined that students
who work for their universities are not employees if their work is
primarily educational, and if their relationship with the university

71. See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 29 (addressing how the NLRA
is applicable to private institutions if it is designed to govern private enterprises).
72. See id. (discussing how the NLRB typically uses several tests to
determine if an employment relationship exists).
73. See id. (discussing the formation of the meaning of employee within the
NLRA).
74. Id. (noting that Congress reaffirmed the right of control test in its TaftHartley Amendments to the Act).
75. See Paladini, A., Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 952 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 19, 1967) (“Rather,
it has been necessary to apply the control test in light of the economic realities of
the particular situation.”).
76. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (N.L.R.B. July 23, 2004)
(determining that the collective bargaining process would be detrimental to the
educational processes).
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is not an economic one.77 Athletes could have easily passed this
two-part test; however, even this test was overturned in 2016 by
Trustees of Columbia University.78 Concerned that Brown
restricted the purpose of the Act—to encourage the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and to protect the exercise by
workers of full freedom and association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing—the Board
found it appropriate to extend statutory coverage to students
working for universities covered by the Act unless there were
strong reasons not to do so.79
1. Potential COVID-19 Impact on Unionization Efforts
The Northwestern players did not lose their case on the
argument players were not employees, but rather that allowing
them to unionize would create jurisdictional issues.80 However, the
NLRB in declining jurisdiction due to the complications of only
having a single school in the NCAA unionized left the door open
for a larger coalition of athletes to try again.81 The COVID-19
pandemic could create this viable opportunity for NCAA athletes
to create this wide-scale coalition with similar goals.82 College
77. See id. (discussing that the principal time commitment of the student is
spent obtaining a degree and therefore the individual is first and foremost a
student).
78. See Tr. of Columbia Univ. in the City of New York & Graduate Workers
of Columbia-GWC, UAW, 364 N.L.R.B. 90 (N.L.R.B Aug. 23, 2016) (overturning
Brown and the decision that graduate student assistants are not employees
within the meaning of the FLSA).
79. See id. (reasoning that given the purpose of the Act, coupled with the
broad statutory definitions of employer and employee, student workers should be
within its protection).
80. See Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 17, 2015) (declining to
rule due to lack of jurisdiction); see also Dan Wolken, Opinion: As College Football
Plans Are Discussed, It’s Time For Athletes To Have A Say, USA TODAY (May 19,
2020) (analyzing the differences in college sports in 2020 versus in 2014 when the
NLRB last considered the issue) [https://perma.cc/7TSX-ZDPW].
81. See Rohan Nadkarni, College Football Players Need a Union Now More
Than Ever, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jul. 2, 2020) (summarizing the previous NLRB
decision and how the time now may be right for a larger group of athletes to repeat
the process to obtain a different outcome) [https://perma.cc/2C6P-BQUN].
82. See Wolken, supra note 80 (discussing how the pandemic has created
leverage for athletes to form a union).
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administrators and coaches pushed for football players to return to
school in the summer of 2020 while numbers of COVID-related
deaths rose—while the players whose health was at risk had no
authoritative voice on the matter without fear of scholarships
being cut.83
The universal hardship felt by the pandemic creates a perfect
storm for NCAA athletes to form a union and have the voice to
negotiate their rights, health concerns, working conditions and
compensation.84 Athletes in the past may have been motivated by
peer pressure from teammates, the fear of losing scholarships, the
appearance of being ungrateful for the opportunities presented or
being snubbed by the legions of fans in refusing to unionize.85 But,
the fear of COVID-19 could allow college athletes to act without
apprehension of blame by understandably wanting to protect
themselves from an unprecedented virus with unknown long-term
effects on health.86
An example of this attempt, called the #WeAreUnited
campaign, was created by many PAC-12 conference football
players in early August 2020.87 Among other requests, the
campaign announced the intention of the athletes to opt-out of
participating in preseason practice, or even regular season games,
unless the conference agreed in writing to guarantee certain
protections related to health, safety, and welfare.88

83. See id. (calling the push of athletes returning to campus amid the
pandemic a “science experiment” promoted by college coaches and
administrators).
84. See id. (discussing how the NCAA resists change until it is pushed by a
legitimate threat and how the COVID-19 pandemic creates that threat).
85. See id. (theorizing that fear of ostracization and losing scholarships
prevails over action to form a union).
86. See id. (discussing how the fear of the unknown from COVID-19 could
benefit athletes by allowing them to act without fear of blame or acting ungrateful
for their scholarship opportunity).
87. See #WeAreUnited, THE PLAYERS’ TRIB. (Aug. 2, 2020) (publishing the
demands of the PAC-12 athletes in the campaign) [https://perma.cc/K6D6BW7N].
88. See Darren Heitner, Could the #WeAreUnited Campaign Lead to the
Unionization of College Athletes?, SPORTSPRO (Aug. 5, 2020) (analyzing the
campaign with potential outcomes for the demands) [https://perma.cc/XZ39UZXD].
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The list of demands the players created is a prime example of
how, when presented, a nationwide event could be the catalyst to
further the rights of NCAA athletes.89 Prompted by the lack of
voice related to decisions that impacted their own personal health,
the athletes created a list of health and safety precautions, but also
demands related to other rights, such as racial injustice and
economic freedom.90 In demanding transparency about the risks
associated with playing amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the players
also stated: “Because immoral rules would punish us for receiving
basic necessities or compensation for the use of our names, images
and likenesses, while many of us and our families are suffering
economically from the COVID-19 fallout, #WeAreUnited.”91 This
clearly demonstrates the ability of these athletes to connect issues
and collectively voice concerns, skills which are essential in
establishing bargaining power regarding their rights.92
While the #WeAreUnited movement gained significant
attention and had the ability to force change, the boycott flopped
after the PAC-12 cancelled, and then later resurrected, the
season.93 While the COVID-19 protection requests were honored,
the other widespread demands were largely ignored by the
conference and the NCAA.94 A potential explanation for this may
be the failure of the athletes to stand united—directly
contradicting the name of the movement.95 For example, some

89. See #WeAreUnited, supra note 87 (showing how the published demands
started with COVID-related threats to physical health, but then stretch to issues
of entire fairness within the NCAA).
90. See id. (demanding not only health-related changes, but also steps to
ensure racial equality and adequate compensation for labor).
91. Id. (emphasizing a need for transparency about risks associated with
playing collegiate sports during the COVID-19 pandemic).
92. See Heitner, supra note 88 (discussing the bargaining power that is
essential to unionize).
93. See Doug Robinson, Whatever Happened to PAC-12 Player Demands? Did
Love of the Game Trump Desire for Change?, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 20, 2020, 1:23
PM) (discussing the failure of the movement and how it went wrong)
[https://perma.cc/PCY7-B82P].
94. See id. (discussing how the leverage existed to make these demands, but
those behind the movement failed to follow through).
95. See id. (revealing that mere days after the publication of the opt-out
threat, players withdrew their statements and joined other movements that
pushed for the continuation of football season).
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athletes fled to the #WeWantToPlay movement credited to
Clemson athletes Trevor Lawrence and Darien Rencher.96 That
movement instead sought to play the season despite the threat of
COVID-19, as other advances in rights would be null if there were
no games played.97 Both movements created headlines but
ultimately became moot when the conferences cleared teams for
fall season—as the allure of playing became too strong for those
boycotting to opt-out of the season as they threatened.98
It is important to note that most professional sports leagues
are heavily unionized, with strong representations most notably in
baseball, football, basketball and hockey.99 Professional sports
unions work with athletes and leagues in areas ranging from
financial security, healthcare coverage, and workplace safety to
philanthropy efforts.100 The sports business has been called
“recession proof,” with organizations weathering large economic
fallouts that often result in high unemployment rates.101 However,
the COVID-19 pandemic and political unrest caused significant
cancellations and postponements that challenged the ability of

96. See David M. Hale, Clemson’s Trevor Lawrence, Darien Rencher: We
Want to Play and Bring About Change, ESPN (Aug. 10, 2020) (discussing the
efforts of the two athletes to work with nearly a dozen other college football
players around the country) [https://perma.cc/5R38-VW7S].
97. See id. (quoting Rencher in regard to NIL efforts and compensation being
held moot if there are no games played to be compensated for).
98. See Robinson, supra note 93 (theorizing that the love for the game and
the desire to play was too strong for these athletes to make significant change);
see also Hale, supra note 96 (quoting Lawrence stating that the number one
priority for athletes was to play).
99. See Maury Brown, As Unions Dwindle, The Value of Those in Pro Sports
Never More Important, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2016, 4:45 PM) (discussing the
importance of unions for the four most prominent professional sports leagues in
the United States) [https://perma.cc/7LF4-Y6NG].
100. See Ross Evans, What Do (Sports) Unions Do in a Pandemic?, ONLABOR
(May 12, 2020) (discussing the areas that unions often cover)
[https://perma.cc/9DLP-JM87].
101. See Matthew Futterman, Kevin Draper, Ken Belson & Alan Blinder, The
Financial Blow of the Coronavirus on Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2020)
(discussing how the business of sports did not suffer even through the September
11 terrorist attacks and the financial crisis of 2008) [https://perma.cc/M6XL8T6Y].
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professional athletes to perform, and in turn be compensated for
their labor.102
The Major League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) is
the union that represents players on the forty-man rosters of the
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) teams, and is often credited with
laying the groundwork on which modern players’ unions were
born.103 The MLBPA and the MLB generated news with initially
not being able to reach a settlement,104 but eventually worked to
reach agreements protecting the players and promoting the game
during the summer of 2020 amid COVID-19 outbreaks by allowing
both sides to voice concerns regarding health safety and season
length.105 Additionally, the MLBPA negotiated baseline salaries if
the season were to be completely cancelled, pro-rated salaries for
the sixty game season, and a minimum per-week stipend and
medical care.106
Another example of the power of unionizing sports was the
ability for National Basketball Association (“NBA”) teams to walk
out of playoff games in protest of police brutality and the shooting
of Jacob Blake.107 Fueled by frustrations regarding lack of support
of the Black Lives Matter movement, players refused to step foot
on the court with the thought that providing basketball games as
entertainment diverted the public’s attention away from the social

102. See id. (detailing how the pandemic caused, for the first time in nearly
two decades, the sports world to pause competition).
103. See id. (discussing the labor strife surrounding the MLB during the
1960s); see also MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS: ABOUT (describing main
functions of the union) [https://perma.cc/6G38-YLKG].
104. See Ron Cook, Will There Be Any Winners in Baseball’s Ongoing
Discord?, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (June 22, 2020, 7:00 AM) (discussing the
“unconscionable bickering” between owners and players while more than forty
million Americans were unemployed) [https://perma.cc/2NHB-4H6C].
105. See Dayn Perry, MLB, MLBPA Reportedly Agree to New COVID-19
Safety Protocols; Rule Breakers Face Season-Long Suspension, CBS SPORTS (Aug.
6, 2020, 1:37 PM) (describing in detail safety protocols and disciplinary measures
for players, team personnel and staff) [https://perma.cc/5HE4-XMXT].
106. See Evans, supra note 100 (discussing some of the fruits of negotiation
by the MLB and MLBPA from Coronavirus concerns).
107. See Rick Wartzman, Jacob Blake, Chris Paul, and the Hidden Power of
the NBA, FAST CO. (Aug. 8, 2020) (discussing the benefits that NBA players
possess by belonging to a union) [https://perma.cc/QBN3-DSQM].
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justice movement.108 By belonging to a union, the athletes were
able to mobilize quickly and take a stand for a cause they were
passionate about.109
The National Basketball Players Association (“NBPA”) has
stated its mission is to “ensure that the rights of NBA players are
protected and that every conceivable measure is taken to assist
players in maximizing their opportunities and achieving their
goals, both on and off the court.”110 Additionally, the NBPA
provides a forum for the athletes to participate in union activities,
such as executive leadership roles, team representative positions,
global community outreach initiatives and more.111 Athletes are
often looked to as leaders and role models, so the ability to
collectively use a single voice to protest social injustice and
promote change is an imperative tool to not only further their own
rights, but also force betterment in communities.112
If college athletes were permitted to unionize, the National
College Players Association (“NCPA”) could make an impact as a
nonprofit organization already in place that aims to protect
student athletes from NCAA legislation.113 The nonprofit advocacy
group has been in place for nearly two decades, with the mission
to “protect future, current, and former college athletes.”114 Among
other goals, such as increasing graduation rates and relaxing

108. See Marc Stein, Led by NBA, Boycotts Disrupt Pro Sports in Wake of
Blake Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020) (analyzing the refusal of the
Milwaukee Bucks to perform in a playoff game, as well as George Hill’s statement
that the games distracted from the focal points of what the issues were)
[https://perma.cc/53CA-XWGF].
109. See Wartzman, supra note 107 (analyzing benefits of being unionized).
110. NBPA: ABOUT (showing the history and general information about the
NBA Players Association) [https://perma.cc/C3XL-5PB3].
111. See id. (explaining opportunities presented to union members).
112. See Play for Change, NBPA: PRESS RELEASES (Sept. 15, 2020) (promoting
the actions of NBA players in protesting systemic racism and reestablishing
commitment to social justice through increased initiatives and amplification of
athlete voices) [https://perma.cc/XGJ4-ZMCH].
113. See Rohan Nadkarni, College Football Players Need a Union Now More
Than Ever, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 2, 2020) (promoting the unionization of
college athletics and the existing association designed to protect athletes)
[https://perma.cc/P258-A6GN].
114. See Mission & Goals, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N (elaborating on goals
the association seeks to reach for athlete rights) [https://perma.cc/V9N6-8SC2].
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transfer rules, the NCPA is another key advocate for the push for
NIL compensation and COVID-19 protections.115
Ramogi Huma, president of the NCPA, believed that the push
of players to return to campus amid the COVID-19 pandemic was
the prime time to organize into a true labor union.116 Using
professional league examples of efforts to protect athletes, as
mentioned above, Huma discussed the ability of those athletes to
have a mechanism to voice concerns and not be “isolated or coerced
into taking risks they are not comfortable with.”117 Collegiate
football coaches have regarded players as “test cases,” with the
ability to use them as a “trial and error” run before the student
bodies returned to campus.118 Comparing the ability of professional
athletes to negotiate with their respective leagues, college athletics
appear to be a “system of fear and power dynamics that’s being
used to stomp out the voices of these athletes.”119
C. Economic Feasibility of Compensation
A recent study released by the National Bureau of Economic
Research discovered that less than seven percent of the revenue
generated by the NCAA is given back to football and men’s
basketball players through their scholarships and living
stipends.120 For comparison, professional athletes for the National
Football League (“NFL”) and the NBA receive approximately fifty
percent of the revenue generated by their athletic activities in the

115. See id. (listing the elimination of NIL restrictions and establishing
mandatory health and safety standards as key goals of the association).
116. See Nadkarni, supra note 113 (discussing the rush to return athletes to
campus during the pandemic under threat of losing nearly $4 billion if football
season did not occur).
117. Id.
118. See id. (recounting statements coaches made to athletes regarding
COVID-19 protection measures).
119. See id. (discussing how the pandemic and ongoing fight for racial equality
have exposed hypocritical systems including college athletics).
120. See Tommy Beer, NCAA Athletes Could Make $2 Million a Year if Paid
Equitably, Study Suggests, FORBES (Sept. 1, 2020, 1:03 PM) (breaking down study
completed by the National Bureau of Economic Research regarding the
redistribution of revenue made by the NCAA) [https://perma.cc/R32N-4RPH].

BLOOD, SWEAT, TEARS

183

form of salary.121 While the NCAA hides behind the shield of
amateurism, the economic reality is that “athletic departments
have developed into complex commercial enterprises that look far
more like professional sports organizations than extracurricular
activities.”122 The NCAA’s proposal would force athletes seeking
compensation to contract with third-parties, undoubtedly
benefitting those athletes who have achieved stardom.123 Results
would be fairer to every athlete, not just the recognizable
quarterback or point guard, if the NCAA or member universities
were to take accountability in compensating their athletes rather
than contracting with third parties for NIL benefits, but the
availability of endorsements could be a step in the right
direction.124
1. Who Profits from Amateurism? The Case of Rent-Sharing and
Fair Market Value
Amateur athletics in the United States prevents student
athletes from sharing in any of the profits generated by their
participation—creating
substantial
economic
rents
for
universities.125 Economic rent is defined as an amount of money
earned that exceeds that which is economically or socially
necessary, which often arises in instances of market inefficiencies
or information asymmetries.126 By compiling data from college
121. See id. (juxtaposing professional sports statistics with the study results).
122. See Craig Garthwaite, Jordan Keener, Matthew J. Notowidigdo & Nicole
F. Ozminkowski, Who Profits From Amateurism? Rent-Sharing in Modern College
Sports (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 27734, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/37JW-QM87].
123. See Michael McCann, Legal Challenges Await After NCAA Shifts on
Athletes’ Name, Image and Likeness Rights, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 29, 2020)
(discussing the availability of endorsement deals from third parties for highly
recognizable men’s basketball and football stars) [https://perma.cc/RYA9-3YZ8].
124. See id. (noting how the availability of third-party compensation is the
most beneficial to men’s basketball and football players, but how female athletes
could also benefit from NIL).
125. See Garthwaite et al., supra note 122 (referencing study conducted by
the National Bureau of Economic Research).
126. See Adam Hayes, Economic Rent, INVESTOPEDIA, (last updated Jan. 19,
2020) (defining economic rent and common instances where it arises)
[https://perma.cc/6Z5V-NFCW].
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athletics departments for revenue producing football teams, it was
found that the rent-sharing effectively transfers resources away
from students who are more likely to be Black and more likely to
come from poor neighborhoods.127
Due to the successful nature of Power Five128 conferences in
athletic play, the athletic departments in those schools are able to
negotiate media rights packages and typically self-sustain on
revenue generated directly by the activities of the athletic
department, which closely represents a commercial enterprise
generating economic rents.129 Without delving into the economic
models that show the distribution of revenue at this time, it is yet
another way athletes are systematically denied compensation they
have earned.130
Football and men’s basketball are the consistent revenueproducing sports at NCAA institutions—and nearly fifty percent of
the athletes participating are Black.131 Advocates of change have
long stated that the Black athlete is the backbone of the process of
producing tremendous wealth—with nearly every other person
involved with the process profiting off of the uncompensated labor
of these players.132 Rent-sharing studies have found that the
efforts of athletes in revenue sports—football and men’s

127. See Garthwaite et al., supra note 122 (analyzing data to determine Black
and lower-income students were those most impacted by rent-sharing).
128. See id. (noting that the Power Five conferences include the Big Ten, PAC12, Big 12, Southeastern Conference (“SEC”), and the Atlantic Coast Conference
(“ACC”)).
129. See id. (explaining that the study uses Power Five schools as the main
sample for the rent-sharing analysis due to the self-sufficient nature of the
athletics programs).
130. See id. (creating a wage structure similar to those in professional sports
leagues to analyze the college athletics data showing the transfer of sources away
from student athletes).
131. See id. (breaking down demographics of Power Five conference football
team rosters by race).
132. See Lulu Garcia-Navarro, Activist on California NCAA Law, NPR:
SPORTS (Oct. 6, 2019, 7:59 AM) (interviewing Harry Edwards, professor at
University of California at Berkeley and former NCAA athlete on the exploitation
of Black athletes resulting from lack of compensation for labor)
[https://perma.cc/S3N7-VBD7].
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basketball—generate the economic rents contributing to coaches’
salaries and spending on other sports.133
If the industry were to be governed by revenue-sharing
agreements, the fair market values of these revenue-sport athletes
demonstrate the magnitude of the economic injustice.134 Using
information from the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act,135 the
average fair market value of a Division I football player per
academic year would equal approximately $208,202—or $832,832
over a four-year span of time.136 If belonging to a Power Five
Conference, those numbers jump to $337,755 and $1,351,020,
respectively.137 For men’s basketball players belonging to Power
Five and Big East Conference institutions, the study found their
value to be $551,183 per academic year, totaling $2,204,733 over
the standard four-year period of play.138
Furthermore, based on decades of data, college athletes of
color in football and men’s basketball have a lower graduation rate
than those of other students, athletes, and their teammates.139
Research shows that students with greater financial security are
more likely to graduate from college.140 According to a report
comparing six-year graduation rates between 2016 and 2018,
Black athletes were graduating at rates that were nineteen
percent behind those for undergraduate students, and Black male
133. See Garthwaite et al., supra note 122 (discussing that the average Power
Five conference football coaching staff was paid approximately $9.6 million—
capturing approximately 7.75% of overall revenue).
134. See Ramogi Huma, Ellen J. Staurowsky & Lucy Montgomery, How the
NCAA’s Empire Robs Predominantly Black Athletes of Billions in Generational
Wealth, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N 1, 2–3 (2020) (examining studies estimating
the fair market value of football and men’s basketball players divided by
conference) [https://perma.cc/2NJT-NCB7].
135. 20 U.S.C.§ 1092 (2018).
136. See id. at 2 (noting the value of a NCAA Division I Football Bowl Series
athlete).
137. See id. at 2–3 (including conferences like the Atlantic Coast Conference,
Big Ten, Big 12, PAC-12, Southeastern Conference and independent programs
like Brigham Young and Notre Dame).
138. See id. at 3 (referencing the same conferences as the football analysis).
139. See id. at 9 (comparing graduation rates of athletes in by race).
140. See id. at 5 (referencing a Pell Institute study in which students from
wealthy families had a high probability of receiving an undergraduate degree,
while only 10% of those from the lowest economic quartile would finish their
degrees).
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athletes were graduating at rates five percent lower than Black
undergraduate men overall.141 Of the sixty-four teams that
participated in the NCAA March Madness tournament in 2017, the
players had a federal graduation rate that was 21.5% behind that
of students at their colleges and universities.142 Because statistics
show that Division I teams consisted predominantly of Black
athletes (fifty-six percent), racial minorities produced the most
revenue, yet suffered the lowest graduation rates for their
respective institutions.143
2. Prospective Compensation Models
The common argument against compensation for collegiate
athletes is based on the inability to pay athletes or the possible
creation of bidding wars over top-level recruits.144 This section is
intended to provide a brief summary of several economic models
that researchers have created to demonstrate that there are viable
options available for the NCAA to pursue.
One of the more popular models has been coined “The Duke
Model,” and it was proposed by Professor David Grenardo.145
Under this model, athletes would be eligible to receive
compensation in the following ways:
1) A base compensation system that pays football players based
on how many games a player started, and whether the athlete
is a starter, back-up, or third stringer. Men’s basketball players

141. See id. at 9 (referencing a report conducted by Southern California’s
Center on Race and Equity on the NCAA Power Five schools).
142. See id. (citing research conducted on federal graduation rates versus the
NCAA-created “graduation success rate,” where the numbers often differ).
143. See id. at 6 (citing data drawn from the NCAA Race and Gender
Demographics Database).
144. See Cody J. McDavis, Paying Students to Play Would Ruin College
Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2019) (positing that paying athletes would distort the
economics of college sports and hurt the broader community of student-athletes)
[https://perma.cc/5963-WKYG].
145. See David A. Grenardo, The Duke Model: A Performance-Based Solution
for Compensating College Athletes, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 157, 164 (2017) (offering a
structure that slows for “consistency, a level of uniformity, predictability, and
opportunity for every university to participate”).
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would be compensated similarly, based on an average of
minutes played during a season.
2) Compensation based on statistical or external athletic
achievement or honors (Heisman Trophy winners, AllAmerican honors, etc.).
3) Compensation
performance.146

based

on

an

athlete’s

academic

This model closely mirrors what would be seen in a structured,
negotiated agreement between the players, the NCAA, and
member institutions.147 This model works by separating
conferences, thus allowing the flexibility to function with both the
highest revenue producers to the lowest.148
Other scholars have pursued the revenue-sharing route, but
in a way that would compensate all college athletes, not just those
in the most prominent sports.149 This particular model aims to
practically provide student athletes with an equitable share of the
revenue they help produce for their athletic departments—
allowing athletes in sports such as track and field, soccer, and golf
to have the opportunity to make financial gains.150 By considering
factors such as team performance, percentage of revenue produced
by each individual athletic team, and individual performance,
athletes would have the opportunity for immediate payout, but
also earned funds would be held in trust funds to be released after

146. See Jason Scott, Professor Proposes Pay for College Athletes, ATHLETIC
BUS. (Apr. 4, 2017) (summarizing Professor Grenardo’s proposal)
[https://perma.cc/ADV8-D98M].
147. See Paul Steinbach, Law Professor Promotes Way to Pay College Athletes,
ATHLETIC BUS. (June 29, 2017) (interviewing Grenardo on his proposal)
[https://perma.cc/KXK4-E34V].
148. See id. (addressing how the Model would prevent conferences that
produce lower revenue from arguing they could not afford to pay players).
149. See Mike Stocz, Nicholas Schlereth, Dax Crum, Alonzo Maestas, and
John Barnes, Student-Athlete Compensation: An Alternative Compensation Model
for All Athletes competing in NCAA Athletics, 1 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. ATHLETICS &
INNOVATION 82, 88 (2019) (framing how revenue-sharing models could include all
sports, not only the highest revenue sports).
150. See id. at 87 (introducing the market economy-based compensation
model the researchers proposed).
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the student graduates.151 This model would provide compensation
to student athletes, but also promote academic success and high
graduation rates.152
Additionally, other proponents of athlete compensation have
proposed the Olympic Model.153 Under this model, amateur
athletes have access to the commercial free market, giving them
the ability to secure endorsement deals, get paid for signing
autographs, or to accept compensation for NIL.154 This model
would not be equitable to all athletes, as many factors such as sport
played, success on the playing field, or even geographic location of
the school, could make an impact on the type of endorsement deals
available.155 However, the idea that compensation could be an even
playing field in the first place may be an unattainable goal.156 As
Southeastern Conference Commissioner Mike Slive stated, “there
are significant differences between institutions in resources,
climate, tradition, history, stadiums and fan interest . . . ” that
make the idea of a level playing field “an illusion.”157
IV. The Impact of Antitrust Litigation
The NCAA has been battered by several antitrust suits in the
past, and it received its latest slap with the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston.158
Previously in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic

151. See id. at 88–89 (explaining the factors and how the model would
compensate student athletes accordingly).
152. See id. at 89 (discussing how the contingency of graduation would benefit
the model).
153. See Ramogi Huma & Ellen J. Staurowsky, The Price of Poverty in Big
Time College Sports, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N 1 (2011) (conducting study
exploring how full scholarships do not cover all expenses of a student athlete and
how the Olympic Model could be an appropriate remedy) [https://perma.cc/WY5Z9GL5].
154. See id. at 5 (discussing that the international definition of amateurism
used by the Olympics allows access to the free market for athletes to profit).
155. See id. at 26 (addressing arguments against implementing the Olympic
Model).
156. See id. (acknowledging the inherent disparities that already exist among
athletes and institutions).
157. Id.
158. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
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Association,159 the Ninth Circuit determined that the NCAA’s
compensation rules were subject to antitrust scrutiny, and the
group of athletes that brought the class action suffered an
antitrust injury as a result of those rules.160 There, the plaintiffs
were current and former college football and men’s basketball
players, alleging violations from restraining trade in relation to
NIL.161 Significantly, the court rejected the argument that NCAA
v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma162 gave authority
to the proposition the NCAA’s rules are presumed valid or exempt
from antitrust scrutiny.163 Instead, the Ninth Circuit applied what
is known as the “rule of reason” test:
[1] The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the
restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a
relevant market. [2] If the plaintiff meets this burden, the
defendant must come forward with evidence of the restraint’s
procompetitive effects. [3] The plaintiff must then show that
any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a substantially less
restrictive manner.164

When applying the above test to the facts, the court found that
when, “[NCAA] regulations truly serve procompetitive purposes,
courts should not hesitate to uphold them.”165 While affirming the
NCAA is subject to antitrust scrutiny, the court firmly struck down
the idea of small cash payments to athletes for compensation.166

159. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th
Cir. 2015) (holding that the NCAA’s compensation rules are within the ambit of
the Sherman Act).
160. See id. at 1067 (determining the rules, having foreclosed the market in
part, resulted in injury).
161. See id. at 1055 (detailing how O’Bannon discovered he was being
depicted in a video game without his consent).
162. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (affirming the Court of Appeals decision that the Sherman
Act applies to NCAA members’ contracts with television networks).
163. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063 (finding that the lengthy discussion of
amateurism rules was dicta, and therefore the court was not bound to conclude
every NCAA rule relating to amateurism automatically valid).
164. Id. at 1070 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
165. Id. at 1079.
166. See id. at 1078–79 (discussing that offering athletes cash sums
untethered to educational expenses is a “quantum leap” in compensation).
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In early 2020, the Ninth Circuit once again took up the topic
of college athlete compensation through an antitrust lens.167 In this
decision, the court considered an appeal of an order enjoining the
NCAA from enforcing rules that restricted the education-related
benefits that member institutions may offer Football Bowl Division
(“FBS”) and Division I basketball players.168 Determining that
O’Bannon was a decision of limited scope and did not preclude the
litigation, the court once again applied the Rule of Reason test and
affirmed the lower court’s decision that the limits were
anticompetitive under federal antitrust law and upheld the
injunction in all respects.169
The injunction upheld in the decision mandated that the
NCAA would have no ability to limit benefits, including
scholarships to complete undergraduate or graduate degrees at
any school, nor to limit the provision of equipment or benefits
including study-abroad programs, paid post-eligibility internships,
or tutoring.170 The NCAA appealed the case to the Supreme Court,
with Chief Legal Officer Donald Remy stating that “the NCAA and
its members continue to believe that college campuses should be
able to improve the student-athlete experience without facing
never-ending litigation regarding these changes.”171 The court
foreshadowed the decision in the appeal, with Judge Smith writing
in her concurring opinion that:
The treatment of Student-Athletes is not the result of free
market competition. To the contrary, it is the result of a cartel

167. See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Athletic
Conference v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2020), and cert. granted sub nom. NCAA v.
Alston, 141 S. Ct. 1231 (2020) (affirming the decision that the NCAA limits on
education-related benefits do not “play by the Sherman Act’s rules”) (citation
omitted).
168. See id. at 1243 (discussing the background of the appeal).
169. See id. at 1256–66 (analyzing the district court’s decision and agreeing
with the reasoning).
170. See Steve Berkowitz, Judge’s Ruling Stands: NCAA Can’t Limit College
Athletes’ Benefits That Are Tied to Education, USA TODAY (May 18, 2020, 4:09
PM) (discussing the details of the injunction from the ruling)
[https://perma.cc/4XLM-56NE].
171. Melissa Quinn, Supreme Court Takes Up NCAA Antitrust Dispute Over
Compensation for College Athletes, CBS NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020, 11:09 AM)
[https://perma.cc/24QB-MJ5A].
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of buyers acting in concert to artificially depress the price that
sellers could otherwise receive for their services. Our antitrust
laws were originally meant to prohibit exactly this sort of
distortion.172

A. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston
In recent years, the NCAA has continued to modify
amateurism rules at a rapid pace with the influx of litigation
regarding antitrust and labor laws.173 Most recently before the
Supreme Court of the United States was the National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Alston,174 in which current and former
student athletes brought an antitrust lawsuit challenging the
NCAA-mandated restrictions on compensation—specifically that
the rules violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.175 It is important to note
the Supreme Court only considered the subset of rules that restrict
education-related benefits, not a full-spectrum challenge of
restraints on athlete compensation.
Many issues most commonly debated in antitrust litigation
were uncontested in the case.176 For example, the parties did not
challenge the definition of the relevant market, that the NCAA
enjoys monopoly control in that labor market, nor that member
schools compete for athletes but remain subject to enforced limits
on the amount of compensation that can be offered.177 Instead, the
Court viewed this as a suit involving “admitted horizontal price

172. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1267 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Athletic
Conference v. Alston, No. 20-520, 2020 WL 7366279 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2020), and cert.
granted sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, No. 20-512, 2020 WL 7366281 (U.S. Dec. 16,
2020).
173. See Jayma Meyer & Andrew Zimbalist, A Win Win: College Athletes Get
Paid for Their Names, Images, and Likenesses and Colleges Maintain the
Primacy, 11 J. OF SPORTS & ENT. L. 247, 254 (2020) (stating the NCAA has
continued to go through rule modifications).
174. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, 594 U.S. *1 (2021).
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (prohibiting “contract[s], combination[s], or
conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade or commerce”); see also Alston, 594 U.S. at *1
(challenging the regulations under the Sherman Act).
176. See Alston, 594 U.S. at *14 (challenging the regulations under the
Sherman Act).
177. See id. (highlighting what the parties did not challenge).
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fixing in a market where the defendants exercise monopoly
control.”178 The main point of issue stemmed from the NCAA’s
argument the standard antitrust “rule of reason” analysis179 was
inapplicable.180
However, the Court found that the rule of reason applies to
restrictions on education-related benefits.181 Although the NCAA
argued that the courts should have given the restrictions a “quick
look,” the Court determined that the issues presented are far too
complex of questions to not perform a fact-specific antitrust
analysis on the anticompetitive effects.182 After rejecting
arguments that the NCAA should be exempt due to it being a joint
venture, that an aside in Board of Regents183 declared
compensation restrictions procompetitive in 1984 and
forevermore, and that the Sherman Act did not apply to
noncommercial enterprises, the Court upheld the use of the rule of
reason and the injunction prohibiting restrictions on educationrelated benefits to student athletes.184
Notably, the Court cites to the Ninth Circuit stating that “[t]he
national debate about amateurism in college sports is
important . . . [b]ut our task as appellate judges is not to resolve it.
Nor could we. Our task is simply to review the district court
judgment through the appropriate lens of antitrust law.”185 Even
178. Id.
179. The “rule of reason” standard consists of a three-part test to determine
if the alleged restraint is unreasonable. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1256 (9th Cir. 2020)
(discussing the three-part framework). The plaintiffs must first show the
challenged practice unreasonably restrains competition in the relevant market.
Id. Once shown, defendants must show a pro-competitive justification for the
practice. Id. Finally, the burden shifts back to plaintiffs to show there is a lessrestrictive alternative available. Id.
180. Alston, 594 U.S. at *15 (stating “the rule of reason” standard consists of
a three-part test to determine if the alleged restraint is unreasonable).
181. See id. at *31.
182. Id. at *21.
183. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (comparing Board of Regents to the current
NCAA case).
184. See Alston, 594 U.S at *22 (summarizing what the Court previously
found in regard to the Sherman Act) (citing to Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468
U.S. at. 101–02).
185. Id. at *35.
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in argument, the NCAA asked the Court to “defer to its conception
of amateurism,” in which the district court found it had not
adopted any consistent definition.186 Although the NCAA claimed
the district court erred by “impermissibly redefin[ing]” its
“product” by rejecting its views about what amateurism requires,
the Supreme Court agreed that the rules and regulations
regarding compensation have “shifted markedly” over time, and
that the analysis was not product redesign, but instead a
straightforward application of the rule of reason.187
Justice Kavanaugh raised many issues not addressed by the
Court in his concurring opinion relating to the legal arguments the
NCAA may, or may not have, in defense of its remaining
compensation laws. However, he also acknowledged difficult policy
and practical questions that would almost certainly arise from the
abolishment of these compensation rules not impacted by the
Alston decision.188 For example, he asked:
How would paying greater compensation to student athletes
affect non-revenue-raising sports? Could student athletes in
some sports but not others receive compensation? How would
any compensation regime comply with Title IX? If paying
student athletes requires something like a salary cap in some
sports in order to preserve competitive balance, how would that
cap be administered? And given that there are now about
180,000 Division I student athletes, what is a financially
sustainable way of fairly compensating some or all of those
student athletes?189

Kavanaugh finished his concurrence with a declaration that,
regardless of the important traditions that have become “part of
the fabric of America . . . The NCAA is not above the law.”190 This
seemingly invited not only litigation to resolve the remaining
questions he framed, but also legislation as a solution for the
NCAA’s compensation regime to comply with antitrust laws.

186. Id. at *29–30 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at *30
188. See Id. at *2–3 (Kavanaugh, B., concurring) (explaining rules which
violate antitrust laws present difficult questions).
189. Id. at *4–5 (Kavanaugh, B., concurring).
190. Id. at *5.
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V. Pushes for Legislative Reform

While Alston provided the answer that the NCAA is not
allowed to cap benefits for education-related expenses under
antitrust provisions, the decision still leaves many hotly debated
issues wide open. One of the most pressing issues is how to
regulate NIL compensation.191
A chain reaction of legislative pushes began in the fall of 2019,
started by California Governor Gavin Newsom signing Senate Bill
206 on September 27, which became known as the Fair Pay for
Play Act.192 This Act is designed to enable college athletes to sign
endorsement deals and hire agents, all while protecting their
collegiate eligibility.193 Written with the intent to ensure
appropriate protections are in place to avoid exploitation of student
athletes, colleges, and universities, Newsom wrote that “the bill
simply and rightfully allows student athletes to benefit from the
multi-billion dollar enterprise of which they are the backbone.”194
It passed both the Assembly (73-0) and the Senate (39-0) without
a single no vote, and prompted a significant increase in other states
and federal legislators introducing similar legislation.195
Other state legislatures took it upon themselves to create NIL
bills—with many having effective dates of July 1, 2021.196 For
example, in June 2020, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio introduced the
Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act.197 This bill would require the
NCAA to implement rules compensating student athletes for
191. Id. at *35 (stating an issue on which the court did not definitively rule).
192. See Matt Norlander, California Governor Signs Law Allowing College
Athletes to be Paid for Name, Image and Likeness as NCAA Protests, CBS SPORTS
(Sept. 30, 2019, 6:49 PM) (discussing the significance of the passing of the bill)
[https://perma.cc/8LQB-AZCE].
193. See id. (detailing highlights of the Fair Pay to Play Act passed in
California).
194. Id.
195. See Gregory, supra note 38 (discussing the overwhelming support of the
California law).
196. See Tracker: Name, Image and Likeness Legislation by State, BCS: BUS
OF COLL SPORTS (June 28, 2021), (listing Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Texas, Kentucky and Ohio) [https://perma.cc/KK4M-7MDG].
197. See Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act, S. 4004, 116th Cong. (2020)
(requiring an intercollegiate athletic association to establish a policy that permits
a student athlete to earn compensation).
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name, image, and likeness from third parties; additionally,
collegiate athletes would be permitted to obtain professional
representation by way of an agent—a benefit once reserved for
athletes only after their amateurism status had been lost.198 Any
violation of the Act would be treated as an unfair or deceptive act
or practice under the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
defines such behaviors as unlawful.199 Significantly, no cause of
action can be brought against the NCAA or an academic institution
for the adoption or enforcement of a policy, rule, or program
established from the Act, thus creating a legal shield for
compliance.200 However, this federal proposal by Rubio directly
counteracts the state bill signed into law by Florida Governor Ron
DeSantis.201 The Intercollegiate Athlete Compensation and Rights
bill authorizes college athletes to earn compensation for use of NIL
and prohibits universities from preventing such compensation.202
California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, and the subsequent flood of
proposed legislation, caused backlash from the NCAA.203 The
NCAA lobbied against SB 206 after its introduction into the
legislature, even going as far as threatening to prohibit all of
California’s fifty-eight member institutions from postseason play if
the bill went into effect on the specified 2023 date.204 Additionally,
the NCAA created a committee referred to as the Federal and State
Legislation Working Group (“Working Group”) to investigate

198. See id. § 3(1)(B) (referencing the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust
Act, 15 U.S.C. 7802, which sets requirements for professional representation).
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2018) (referencing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1), in
which unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared
unlawful).
200. See Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act, § 4(b) (providing an exception
section allowing intercollegiate athletic associations a shield if found to be acting
in good faith compliance with the Act).
201. See generally, Intercollegiate Athlete Compensation and Rights, SB 646
(Fla. 2020).
202. See id. (listing details of the bill).
203. See generally, Michael Long, Fair Pay to Play: Is the NCAA learning an
expensive lesson?, SPORTSPRO (Oct. 18, 2019) [https://perma.cc/J2NZ-MCC3].
204. See id. (describing the bill and NCAA’s lobbying efforts).
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possible responses to the proposed legislation regarding NIL.205 In
a report submitted to the NCAA’s Board of Governors, the Working
Group recommended that the NCAA draft its own Pay for Play
framework that is “consistent with NCAA values and principles
and legal precedent.”206
In addition to representatives promoting their own proposed
federal legislation, the Working Group also recommended
Congressional action.207 These recommendations included
engaging Congress to ensure federal preemption of state NIL laws,
establishing antitrust exemptions for the NCAA, safeguarding the
nonemployment status of athletes, and maintaining a distinction
between college athletes and professional athletes.208 However, in
asking Congress for help, the NCAA opened the doors for even
more scrutiny and criticism regarding athlete welfare.209 Several
congressional members are seeking more than just reform within
NIL laws—instead putting an emphasis on “reforms with real
teeth and real protection for the athletes.”210 While narrow NIL
laws are a step in the right direction in compensation, they still
restrict the protection of student athletes in other areas and
prevent the gain of warranted rights.211
With the directly counteracting state versus federal laws, the
pressure increased on the NCAA and federal lawmakers to find a

205. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Working Group to Examine Name,
Image and Likeness, NCAA (May 14, 2019, 2:40 PM) (discussing the appointing
of a board and the positions it will examine) [https://perma.cc/39CF-KY9M].
206. NCAA Board of Governors Federal and State Legislation Working Group
Final Report and Recommendations, 8 (April 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/P6E8HSUY].
207. See id. at 25–27 (urging the NCAA Board of Governors to engage
Congress).
208. See id. at 27 (listing goals for the Board of Governors to reach for in
Congressional action).
209. See Emily Giambalvo, As the NCAA Asks Congress for Help on NIL
Legislation, Lawmakers Want More Rights for College Athletes, WASH. POST (July
23, 2020, 5:39 PM) (discussing feedback received by the NCAA upon requesting
national standards in NIL legislation and an antitrust exemption from Congress)
[https://perma.cc/A9GX-2QF4].
210. See id. (quoting U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal criticizing the way the
NCAA has approached compensating college athletes).
211. See id. (discussing the need to broaden the lens beyond endorsement
deals and include basic rights and athlete welfare).
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nationwide solution to varying NIL compensation models.212 Due
to the steady increase in legislation regarding compensation
related to NIL, the NCAA’s Board of Governors created a deadline
of January 2021 for a workable athlete compensation
framework.213 The tentative plans would allow players to profit
from fame, on the condition that they will not be treated as
employees.214 A statement released by the NCAA said that the
modernization of the compensation rules should fall within certain
guidelines, including: “[T]he clear distinction between collegiate
and professional opportunities, that compensation for athletics
performance or participation is impermissible, and that student
athletes are students first, not employees of the university.”215 The
compensation allowed to these athletes is strictly from third-party
sources—not the NCAA, member schools or conferences.216
Therefore, athletes must contract with outside parties to receive
compensation, and then they must disclose the details with their
respective schools.217 Additionally, athletes would not be allowed
to use their schools’ logos or brands—as these are personal deals
made in their individual capacities.218

212. See Dan Murphy, NCAA, Congress Have a Labyrinth of Options, But NIL
Clock Still Ticking, ESPN (Dec. 17, 2020) (discussing the variety of legislation
that has been proposed thus far) [https://perma.cc/85A2-MJ2P].
213. See Billy Witz, NCAA is Sued for Not Paying Athletes as Employees, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019) (referencing statement released by NCAA that was spurred
by the passing of the California Act rewarding collegiate athletes for the use of
their name, image and likeness) [https://perma.cc/F7F8-XU2V].
214. See id. (noting the restrictions put on the potential NIL framework).
215. See Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and
Likeness Opportunity, NCAA: NEWS (Oct. 29, 2019, 1:08 PM) (citing principles and
guidelines the NCAA governing board wishes to utilize in updating compensation
rules) [https://perma.cc/HEX2-UX9B].
216. See Ralph D. Russo, Skeptics Loom as NCAA Builds Guardrails Around
Compensation, NBC PHILA. (Apr. 29, 2020, 8:34 PM) (breaking down the details
of the proposed NCAA plan) [https://perma.cc/SF9T-UGA6].
217. See id. (discussing how the NCAA would like to build “guardrails” around
third-party compensation by monitoring deals made and requiring the disclosure
of details).
218. See id. (giving the example of a star quarterback being unable to wear
the recognizable Clemson tiger paw).
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However, the NCAA announced January 11, 2021, that the
vote on athlete compensation rules would be delayed.219 In a
statement, the Division I Council said that it “remains fully
committed to modernizing Division I rules in ways that benefit all
student-athletes,” and that “external factors” required the pause
in voting for the proposed legislation.220 Additionally, pressure
from the Justice Department’s antitrust division may have added
to the delay.221 According to a letter sent on behalf of the
Department, parts of the NCAA’s prospective approach to the NIL
deals may “raise concerns under the antitrust laws.”222
The refusal to vote on NIL legislation came on an important
date in college athletics—the college football national
championship game.223 To advocates for change in the system, the
denial to vote on compensation legislation on the day of the biggest
money-making game in college football was a “slap in the face to
college athletes.”224 The Division I, II, and III Student-Athlete
Advisory Committees (“SAAC”), consisting of current athlete
representatives from member schools, released a statement
disclosing the “disappointment” felt by the delay in the vote on
NIL.225 To several lawmakers invested in increasing the rights of
219. See Dan Murphy & Adam Rittenburg, NCAA Delays Vote to Change
College Athlete Compensation Rules, ESPN (Jan. 11, 2021) (discussing the
NCAA’s decision to indefinitely delay the vote on the proposed rule change
regarding compensation) [https://perma.cc/F6D8-2GZS].
220. Id.
221. See Steve Berkowitz and Christine Brennan, Justice Department Warns
NCAA Over Transfer and Name, Image, Likeness Rules, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2021,
4:00 PM) (discussing the letter sent by the Justice Department to NCAA
President Mark Emmert presenting issues with the rules that were to be voted
on at the upcoming Division I Counsel meeting) [https://perma.cc/6PMM-GAPE].
222. Id.
223. See Alabama vs. Ohio State: Date, Time, TV Channel for the 2021
National Championship Game, NCAA.COM (Jan. 12, 2021) (summarizing the
need-to-know information regarding the game and the outcome)
[https://perma.cc/KW6W-SMTH].
224. See NCAA Refusal to Vote on NIL Pay is “Slap in the Face” to Athletes,
NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS ASS’N: NCPA PRESS RELEASES & ADVISORIES (Jan. 11, 2021)
(quoting NCPA Executive Director Ramogi Huma’s statement on the refusal of
the NCAA committee to vote on the proposed legislation) [https://perma.cc/WB9Y4DQL].
225. See Student-Athlete Committees Issue Joint Statement on Name, Image,
Likeness Legislation Delay, NCAA: NEWS (Jan. 15, 2021) (discussing the belief
that the recommendations developed align with the best interests of student
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student athletes, the action by the NCAA does not create
meaningful legislation to protect athletes but instead does nothing
more than protect their deep pockets and pacify those pushing for
change.226
A. Current NIL Law
Due to this patchwork of state law and the impending state
legislation effective dates, the NCAA adopted an interim policy
suspending amateurism rules relating to NIL that took effect July
1, 2021.227 Specifically, the policy allows college athletes to engage
in NIL activities consistent with the law of the state where the
school is located; if the state does not have NIL laws in place,
college athletes may engage in similar activity under a schoolcreated policy without violating NCAA NIL rules.228 Athletes are
allowed to use professional services providers for NIL activities. 229
While temporarily removing restrictions on NIL-related
regulations, the NCAA remains committed on avoiding pay-forplay and improper inducements as a recruiting tool.230
NIL, also sometimes called right to publicity, will allow college
athletes to accept money in exchange for featuring in
advertisements and/or products.231 Just on the first day of allowing
NIL compensation, many athletes have been able to cash in on

athletes and the dedication to see it passed as soon as possible)
[https://perma.cc/ZM66-NAA7].
226. See Ryan Nicol, Chip LaMarca Bashes Proposed NCAA Changes on
Athlete Compensation, FLAPOL (Apr. 29, 2020) (quoting Chip LaMarca, a Florida
lawmaker, regarding the blame shifting done by the NCAA caused by the push in
state attempts to protect student athletes) [https://perma.cc/626W-QV9T].
227. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and
Likeness Policy, NCAA.ORG (June 30, 2021, 4:20 PM) (announcing the interim
policy
and
describing
what
it
provides
for
student
athletes)
[https://perma.cc/MXC2-NSH5].
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Dan Murphy, NCAA Name, Image and Likeness FAQ: What The Rule
Changes Mean For The Athletes, Schools And More, ESPN (June 30, 2021),
(providing information on the NCAA approved NIL compensation plan)
[https://perma.cc/5MPN-QSKR].
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their rights to sell their names, images and likenesses.232 For
example, twin sisters and basketball stars Hanna and Haley
Cavinder signed a deal with Boost Mobile just minutes after
midnight.233 However, it is still not a complete free market—
schools or state laws may still restrict athletes on regards to what
they endorse.234 For example, athletes cannot endorse alcohol,
tobacco, or gambling products in many places.235
It is important to remember that this is compensation from
third parties only.236 Almost all state laws and the NCAA’s interim
policy explicitly prohibit schools from paying the athletes
directly—thus keeping athletes clearly distinguishable from
employees.237 This interim NCAA policy is in place until federal
legislation or definitive NCAA rules are adopted.238 The recent
decision of Alston finding that compensation caps violate antitrust
law is likely the reason that the NCAA took this more laissez faire
approach in allowing schools to create NIL policies with few
guidelines.239 NCAA President Mark Emmert stated they will
“continue to work with Congress to develop a solution that will
provide clarity on a national level . . . [t]he current environment—
both legal and legislative—prevents us from providing a more
permanent solution and the level of detail student-athletes
deserve.”240 However, Congress does not seem to be nearing a
consensus on how to approach NIL.241 This has become a
bipartisan issue, with Republicans wishing to keep legislation
232. See Dan Murphy, Let’s Make a Deal: NCAA Athletes Cashing in on Name,
Image and Likeness, ESPN (July 1, 2021, 11:37 AM), (discussing deals several
NCAA athletes were able to secure) [https://perma.cc/PY5E-N4QC].
233. Id. (providing an example of one of the deals NCAA athletes were able to
secure).
234. See Murphy, supra note 231 (describing the rules on the NCAA approved
NIL compensation plan).
235. Id. (stating an example of the limitations on what athletes can do).
236. Id. (highlighting the scope of the compensation limitations).
237. Id. (explaining the purpose of the rules prohibiting schools from paying
athletes directly).
238. Id. (noting the temporary nature of the policy).
239. See generally National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston, 594 U.S.
*1 (2021); Hosick, supra note 227.
240. Hosick, supra note 227.
241. See Murphy, supra note 231 (“Members of Congress have yet to agree on
what should be included in a national law.”).
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narrow to allowing third-party compensation, while Democrats see
this as an opportunity to allow a more full-spectrum approach
including granting athletes bargaining and healthcare-related
rights.242
VI. NIL Compensation Alone Is Not Enough
For Senator Cory Booker, the recent upheaval over the rights
of college athletes has created an opportunity for the federal
government to act, “to make sure there are certain basic rights that
every athlete has, that will protect their health, protect their wellbeing, that will protect their achievement of an education, and
address other issues of exploitation that continue.”243 From this, he
and Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced the College Athletes
Bill of Rights (“Bill of Rights”), which encompasses not only NIL
compensation, but revenue sharing agreements, enforceable
health and safety standards, and improved educational
opportunities for all college athletes.244 The NCAA has shown
throughout its history that, while it will address the need for
reform in establishing rights for athletes, it very rarely succeeds in
substantively implementing it.245
Due to the need of public outcry to force the NCAA to change,
a wide-ranging federal bill covering multiple faucets of athlete
exploitation is the solution.246 While acknowledging the Bill of
Rights is a “comprehensive overhaul” of the current NCAA system,
the reform required in every provision is attainable based on
242. See id. (same).
243. See Steve Berkowitz, College Athletes “Bill of Rights” Unveiled by U.S.
Senators Seeking to Change NCAA Systems, USA TODAY (Aug. 13, 2020, 1:15 PM)
(discussing how the recent push for NIL legislation has opened the door for
broader awarding of rights to college athletes) [https://perma.cc/HL8C-N67M].
244. See Senators Booker and Blumenthal Introduce College Athletes Bill of
Rights, CORY BOOKER: NEWS (Dec. 17, 2020) (announcing the introduction of the
legislation) [https://perma.cc/4WZ6-7RHM].
245. See supra Part 0 (using the changing rules of amateurism to demonstrate
this history); see also Cory Booker, Why I’m Behind the Athletes Bill of Rights,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 20, 2021) (discussing how NCAA President Mark
Emmert agreed that there should be change regarding compensation in 2014 but
has failed to act over six years later) [https://perma.cc/W7RY-W9YS].
246. See Booker, supra note 245 (determining that Congress must act to
protect the wellbeing of athletes as the NCAA fails to act without significant fire
from the press and public).
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fundamental principles of fairness.247 The bill is framed not only
from Senator Booker’s experience as a Division I football player at
Stanford, but also from recent outcries from current athletes based
around racial inequalities and social injustice.248 Designed to set a
new baseline standard, the bill seeks to compensate all athletes,
but also fight for the equitable treatment of Black athletes who are
over-represented in revenue-generating sports.249
The bill tackles NIL compensation, stating that “an institution
of higher education, an intercollegiate athletic association, or a
conference may not restrict the ability of college athletes,
individually or as a group, to market the use of their names,
images, likenesses, or athletic reputation.”250 However,
compensation opportunities are not stopped at NIL endorsement
deals.251 This proposal requires that schools share fifty percent of
profit with athletes from revenue-generating sports after
accounting for cost of scholarships.252 Using data supplied by
universities, this formula would mean payouts of $173,000 a year
to football players, $115,600 to men’s basketball players, $19,050
to women’s basketball players, and $8,670 to baseball players on
full scholarship.253 This revenue-sharing provision is likely to be
the most problematic in getting the bill passed into law, but the

247. See Senators Booker and Blumenthal Introduce College Athletes Bill of
Rights, supra note 244 (quoting Senator Blumenthal as stating that “every single
provision is doable and based on the fundamental principle of fairness”).
248. See Billy Witz, Bill Offers New College Sports Model: Give Athletes a Cut
of the Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020) (referencing the recent scrutiny of
institutions across the country for systemic racism) [https://perma.cc/83MFLTCE].
249. See Senators Booker and Blumenthal Introduce College Athletes Bill of
Rights, supra note 244 (discussing the disproportionate number of Black athletes
from lower income households in revenue-producing sports that pay lavish
salaries to predominately white coaches).
250. College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 5062, 116th Cong. § 3 (2020).
251. See Senators Booker and Blumenthal Introduce College Athletes Bill of
Rights, supra note 244 (discussing the minimal restrictions proposed for NIL
opportunities).
252. See id. (giving the example of Division I women’s basketball players
receiving 50% of total revenue generated by their play after deducting the cost of
scholarships awarded to all Division I women’s basketball players).
253. See Witz, supra note 248 (quoting Senator Booker’s study supplied by
numbers from the Department of Education).
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numbers seem insignificant when compared to coaches’ salaries.254
For example, many football coaches earned over $3 million just this
year, with Auburn paying its former head coach over $21 million
in a buy-out provision.255
While the revenue-sharing provision is contentious, the
additional factors of athlete welfare are what sets the Bill of Rights
apart from other proposed legislation.256 If enacted, the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention would consult with both the
Sports Science Institution and the NCAA to develop health, safety,
and wellness standards that would address topics ranging from
concussion protocols to sexual assaults.257 Additionally, a Medical
Trust Fund is to be established that athletes can use to cover the
costs of any out-of-pocket medical expenses—for both the duration
as their time as a college athletes and five years after the
expiration of eligibility if used to treat a sport-related injury.258
Many athletes suffer lifelong injuries—some that do not even fully
unfold until years past careers—that cause significant medical
costs.259 Due to this, the Bill of Rights also gives athletes suffering
from long-term injuries, such as chronic traumatic encephalopathy
(“CTE”), the ability to continue drawing from the fund to treat
these injuries.260
As discussed earlier in this Note, college athletes, particularly
Black male athletes, graduate at a much lower rate than their
peers.261 The Bill of Rights aims to provide improved educational
outcomes and opportunities by allowing athletes to receive a
254. See id. (analyzing potential issues arising from the proposed legislation).
255. See id. (using data from USA Today database and news surrounding the
firing of Auburn’s Gus Malzahn).
256. See Senators Booker and Blumenthal Introduce College Athletes Bill of
Rights, supra note 244 (referencing mandatory health, safety and wellness
standards).
257. See id. (summarizing section seven of the bill).
258. See id. (discussing the establishment of the trust fund for medicalrelated expenses).
259. See Booker, supra note 245 (discussing the need for the fund due to the
number of injuries and no support available to pay related medical costs).
260. See College Athletes Bill of Rights, § 6 (elaborating on health care
services for current and past college athletes).
261. See supra Part III.C (showing that Black male athletes graduate at a
rate 19% less than other undergraduates).
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scholarship for as many years as it takes for them to complete their
undergraduate degree.262 Furthermore, coaches and athletic
department personnel would be banned from influencing or
retaliating against a college athlete for a choice of major that could
be seen as taking time and focus away from the sport, as well as
prohibiting the restriction of the ability to accept internships or
extracurriculars an athlete wishes to participate in.263 Also
catering to academic freedom, the bill includes a provision that
would ban restrictions or penalties associated with athletes
attending the institution of their choice—including transfer
bans.264
Finally, the bill seeks to establish the Commission on College
Athletics, a group composed of nine members—including no fewer
than five former college athletes—to ensure these new rights are
upheld and that athletes are aware of them.265 The Commission
would have enforcement powers, with the ability to levy fines,
impose penalties, or even commence civil actions against
institutions or individuals that violate provisions of the Bill of
Rights.266 To ensure the provisions are being followed, each school
would be required to provide annual public reporting describing
total revenues and expenditures and the number of hours athletes
commit to athletic activities—including voluntary workouts, film
study, and game travel.267 As noted earlier in the PAC-12 study,
so-called voluntary activities and travel time for competitions are
not factored into time restraints.268 Due to this misleading data
and inadequately enforced time restrictions, it is difficult for
262. See College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 5062, 116th Cong. § 8 (2020)
(guaranteeing scholarship funds until an undergraduate degree is received,
without regard for whether the individual is playing sports for the institution).
263. See id. (ensuring there will be no influence regarding selection of
coursework, major, or internship opportunities).
264. See id. § 3(d) (setting rules relating to transfer requirements).
265. See id. § 11 (elaborating on Commission establishment and
requirements).
266. See id. § 12 (detailing the enforcement abilities of the newly established
Commission).
267. See id. § 10 (informing schools of the details that must be included on the
report to be sent to the Commission).
268. See Student-Athlete Time Demands, supra note 57 (noting that nonmandatory activities were not factored into a study that found student athletes
regularly spent well over forty hours a week on their sport).
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athletes to balance a full course load, earn a degree on time, and
meet the demands of the sport.269 The enforcement abilities of the
Commission, with its subpoena power and penalties, gives the Bill
of Rights teeth to ensure the athletes receive the benefits that the
bill intends to give them.270
VII. Conclusion
The NCAA has proven to be reluctant to change without
significant pressure from the public or the legislature demanding
reform.271 The argument over NIL compensation provides a
bipartisan sweet spot, in which representatives from both sides
can unite over the need to create national law relating to the
NCAA’s amateurism model.272 While the College Athletes Bill of
Rights does not grant athletes employee status, it does create a
framework that would guarantee similar rights and protections.273
It advances athlete rights far beyond the third-party only NIL
compensation models, taking into account the “systematic
exploitation on the part of the NCAA that has robbed generation
after generation of college athletes of the justice, fairness and
opportunity that these young people deserve.”274
Legislators have acknowledged that college athletics is one of
the only industries that can rely on a large set of people’s talents
for which they can deny them any earnings and all

269. See Booker, supra note 245 (discussing the “fiction” created by the NCAA
that a scholarship for education is proportionate compensation).
270. See Senators Booker and Blumenthal Introduce College Athletes Bill of
Rights, supra note 244 (quoting Senator Blumenthal’s statement on why he
supports the bill).
271. See supra Part II.
(discussing the slow changes over history regarding NCAA bylaws related to
amateurism); see also Patrick Hruby, How Fighting the NCAA Became a
Bipartisan Sport, WASH. POST (March 17, 2020) (discussing how the threat of
state NIL laws prompted the NCAA to change its “long-standing antipathy to
federal oversight” by reaching out to Congress) [https://perma.cc/SB5K-Z8MW].
272. See Hruby, supra note 271 (discussing the ability of bipartisan
legislature to unite over issues within the lack of a uniform compensation model
for college athletes).
273. See generally College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 5062, 116th Cong. (2020).
274. Booker, supra note 245.
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compensation.275 Recent unrest has once again exposed
inequalities in the college athletic system. However, this time,
there is proposed legislation that has the ability to create
comprehensive reform that is so desperately needed.

275. See Billy Witz, California Lawmakers Vote to Undo NCAA Amateurism,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019) (last updated June 21, 2021) (quoting California
Senator Nancy Skinner) [https://perma.cc/4A7M-7W4L].

